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Climate negotiation outcomes are difficult to evaluate objectively because there are no 
clear reference scenarios. Subjective assessments from those directly involved in the 
negotiations are particularly important, as this may influence strategy and future 
negotiation participation. Here we analyze the perceived success of the climate 
negotiations in a sample of more than 600 experts involved in international climate 
policy. Respondents were pessimistic when asked for specific assessments of the current 
approach centered on voluntary pledges, but were more optimistic when asked for 
general assessments of the outcomes and usefulness of the climate negotiations. 
Individuals who are more involved in the negotiation process tended to be more 
optimistic, especially in terms of general assessments. Our results indicate that two 
reinforcing effects are at work: a high degree of involvement changes individuals’ 
perceptions and more optimistic individuals are more inclined to remain involved in the 
negotiations.  
 
The difficulty and controversy in evaluating the outcomes of the climate negotiations, and any 
negotiations for that matter, are caused by the lack of a counterfactual situation. One is thus 
forced to compare the outcomes of the negotiations with hypothetical reference scenarios 
which, depending on the circumstances or personality of the evaluator, may range from a 
dramatic scenario in which the negotiations collapse to the best case scenario in which all 
major emitters sign and ratify an ambitious agreement. For this reason, it is not hard to find 
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diverging views on the success of the climate negotiations (1-3). In this paper, we investigate 
the views of the experts involved in the diplomatic and scientific efforts relating to climate 
change. Their beliefs are insightful because they reveal trends across different expert groups, 
and may ultimately be informative about what to expect from future climate negotiations. 
Specifically, our study enables us to make the following contributions to the climate policy 
literature. First, we shed light on the experts’ perspective with regards to the achievement of 
the collective 2°C target and the country-specific pledges set forth in the Paris Agreement. 
Such insights are highly relevant and readily applicable to domestic as well as international 
climate policy. Second, the experts’ assessment of the success of past and current negotiations 
is important because it gives us an indication of the degree of effort that negotiators will exert 
in the future: if they have little confidence in a given architecture, it is reasonable to assume 
that they will disengage from it and prioritize alternative approaches in future negotiations. 
Third, from an academic standpoint, the study is a testbed to validate or refute scholarly 
theories and observations on the basis of the experts’ views. In sum, accounting for often-
neglected behavioral and contextual factors can substantially improve the economic analysis 
of the climate change problem and can provide policy makers with useful tools to better 
design future climate change policies (4). 
Previous studies have investigated opinions and traits of negotiators and policy makers using 
survey or experimental methods (5-15), but none have examined the perceived success of the 
international climate negotiations. Another related branch of literature has studied the climate 
conferences as important sites for transnational action where a multitude of actors, including 
non-state actors, come together to exchange ideas and knowledge, build interpersonal 
relationships, organize resistance, and propose policy alternatives (16-22). 
Our analysis is based on data from a worldwide survey with 656 respondents from more than 
130 countries. Participants were recruited from the two main institutions that the international 
community has established to address climate change: the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) (see Methods and Supplementary Table 1). Using a standardized online 
questionnaire, we asked respondents about their views on several past and recent outcomes of 
the climate negotiations. We thereby distinguished between “general assessments” in which 
respondents were not provided with any evaluation criteria and “specific assessments” in 
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which the evaluation criteria were clearly specified (see Supplementary Information for a 
brief overview of the history of climate negotiations and our questionnaire).  
 
Analytic Approach 
To avoid bias arising from the public debate, the survey took place in the months preceding 
the twenty-first Conference of Parties (COP) in December 2015 in Paris. During that time, it 
was not yet clear how exactly the final agreement would look, but the general approach was 
well known thanks to the preparatory work of the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action since 
late 2011. Specifically, it was known that the “intended nationally determined contributions” 
(INDCs) would be the main tool of the then forthcoming agreement. The intended 
contributions are non-binding national pledges for reducing greenhouse gas emissions in the 
coming years. Countries were asked to submit their pledges ahead of attending COP 21 in 
Paris. 
In our empirical analysis, we pay special attention to the interrelation between individuals’ 
involvement in the negotiation process and their evaluations. To this end, we take into 
account how often an individual participated in the climate conferences and in which role. 
Individuals can attend the COPs either as member of a party or an observer organization. 
Parties are the main actors at the COPs. Coming from ministries and related agencies, most 
party members act as representatives of states or regions, and they define positions and make 
decisions on behalf of the constituency. National delegations also include non-state actors 
representing different expert or interest groups who support the formation of specific 
positions (23). Observers take part in the conferences without having been delegated decision 
power in the negotiation process. At the individual level, the distinction between party and 
observer is not always sharp, as a fraction of COP participants, in particular non-state actors 
such as non-government organizations (NGOs) or scientists, assume different roles in 
different years. Our sample includes mainly state actors who attend the COPs as parties and 
scientists who often attend as observer or party. Other non-state actors are only included if 
they have been part of national delegations (see Methods). 
We assume that the degree of involvement in the negotiation process is higher the more COPs 
an individual has attended; furthermore, everything else equal, involvement is assumed to be 
higher when one attends a COP as party member as opposed to observer. Importantly, in order 
to relate involvement to the evaluation of the outcome, we have to take into account when an 
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individual took part. For the evaluation of the Kyoto Protocol, we consider the attendance rate 
from COP 3 in 1997 in Kyoto to COP 7 in 2001 in Marrakech, as the Kyoto Protocol was 
adopted and finalized during these conferences. For the evaluation of the Durban Platform of 
Enhanced Action, we consider the attendance rate from COP 15 in 2009 in Copenhagen to 
COP 20 in 2014 in Lima. The failed attempt to agree on a successor to the Kyoto Protocol at 
COP 15 in Copenhagen initiated a new bottom-up approach that started with the Copenhagen 
Accord, continued with the Durban Platform of Enhanced Action, and finally resulted in the 
Paris Agreement. 
Fig. 1 presents an overview of the outcomes that we included in the survey and the type of 
assessment. For the Kyoto Protocol and the general usefulness of the climate conferences, 
respondents were not provided with any evaluation criteria, but were instead asked for a 
general assessment based on their own evaluation criteria. In the case of the Durban Platform 
and the forthcoming Paris Agreement, we used two different types of evaluations. First, 
respondents were asked how confident they were about the Durban Platform with respect to 
participation, stringency, and overall effectiveness. These questions did not provide any 
evaluation criteria and thus also elicited general subjective assessments. Second, respondents 
were asked four questions about the INDCs. These questions clearly specified the evaluation 
criteria in the sense that, in hindsight, the answers to these questions can be evaluated as 
objectively right or wrong. They thus elicited a specific assessment.   
 
Assessment of the Climate Negotiations 
Our main regressions are based on binary probit models. To this end, we define a binary 
variable titled “optimistic,” which is set to one if an individual provided a more optimistic 
assessment and zero otherwise (see Methods). Our main explanatory variables are the number 
of COPs that an individual attended either as a party member (“Involvement as Party”) or as 
an observer (“Involvement as Observer”). All included control variables are listed in the 
legends of Tables 1 and 2. The definitions and summary statistics of all the explanatory 
variables are shown in the Supplementary Tables 2 and 3. We also provide robustness 
analyses in the Supplementary Tables 7-21 which show that our main results hold under 
alternative estimation models, different sets of explanatory variables, and separate regressions 
for the UNFCCC and the IPCC sample. 
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The upper part of Table 1 presents the regression results for all the general assessments. This 
includes the assessments of the Kyoto Protocol, the Durban Platform, and the perceived 
usefulness of the climate conferences. The results show that a high degree of involvement as 
party, that is, a high number of COPs attended as a party member, increases the likelihood of 
providing an optimistic assessment. This effect is statistically significant in four out of five 
questions. The marginal effect of 0.09 for the Kyoto Protocol means that an individual’s 
likelihood of giving an optimistic assessment increases on average by approximately 9 
percentage points for every additional COP attended as party. The values for the other 
questions can be interpreted in the same way. Perceptions are clearly influenced by whether 
respondents attended the climate meetings predominantly as party member or observer. The 
effect of being involved as observer is positive and significant in only two out of five 
questions. In the other three questions, it is negative, and in one of them, significant. 
The lower part of Table 1 shows the regression results for the specific assessments of the 
INDCs. Here, we find that involvement as party has a positive and significant effect only 
when it comes to fulfillment of the announced pledges. An additional attendance as a party 
increases the estimated probability of being confident that countries will fulfil their pledges on 
average by 2 percentage points. In two out of four questions, there is no significant effect and, 
when asked whether the current INDCs were sufficient to reach the 2°C target, the more 
involved respondents are even more skeptical than those who were less involved. Individuals 
with a higher attendance rate as observer also have lower confidence that the current INDCs 
will be consistent with the 2°C target. There is no significant effect for the other three 
questions. 
Fig. 2 illustrates the average estimated probability of being optimistic for all questions, 
depending on the number of relevant COPs attended as party. It shows that respondents’ 
general assessments of the Kyoto Protocol, the Durban Platform, and the usefulness of the 
climate conferences are generally more optimistic than the specific assessments of the INDCs. 
The general assessments become more optimistic with respondents’ involvement in the 
negotiations. The exception is “stringency” which we will discuss below. In contrast, the 
specific assessments of the INDCs, again with one exception, do not change or become more 
pessimistic with involvement. Thus, while the difference between the general assessments and 
the specific assessments is moderate for individuals who were not deeply involved in the 
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relevant COPs, the difference clearly increases with the degree of involvement, and is quite 
large for highly involved individuals.  
 
Causality 
Thus far, the regression analysis points to a link between degree of involvement and 
respondents’ optimism: the more an individual has been involved in the negotiation process 
the more likely it is that this person has a positive general view on the outcomes. However, 
the causality could also run in the other direction: the more optimistic an individual, the more 
likely it is that this person gets involved in the process and perseveres. Pessimistic individuals 
may simply drop out of the negotiation process. 
In order to test for this possibility, we ran another series of regressions with a subsample. 
Specifically, to control for the degree of involvement, we consider only individuals who 
served two or three times as party. Due to a relatively low number of observations for the 
Kyoto Protocol, we can run this test only for the assessments of the recent outcomes 
(usefulness of climate conferences, Durban Platform, and INDCs). Restricting the sample to 
individuals with a similar number of COP attendances as party allows us to control for the 
degree of involvement and to distinguish between parties to the latest COPs (20 and 21) and 
parties to earlier COPs. Of course, we do not know if some of the negotiators who did not 
attend COPs 20-21 will re-join future negotiations, but we do know that they missed two very 
important conferences. The results for both general and specific assessments are shown in 
Table 2. The dummy variable “Party at latest COPs” indicates whether an individual was a 
party member at COPs 20 and 21. The sign of the dummy variable is always positive and in 
six out of eight questions it is statistically significant. Interestingly, the finding that the “late 
parties” are more optimistic than the “early parties” (as defined above) applies to both general 
and specific assessments. Fig. 3 illustrates the difference in the average estimated 
probabilities of providing an optimistic assessment between early parties and late parties, 
confirming that  the latter are more optimistic irrespective of the type of assessment. 
 
Discussion  
Our empirical analysis provides two important findings. First, respondents’ assessments of 
negotiation issues vary substantially, with low confidence in the current approach of voluntary 
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pledges, but more positive general assessments of the climate negotiations. These findings 
broadly accord with recent international climate policy analyses. Our pre-Paris study 
highlights low confidence in the INDCs to deliver in terms of meeting the 2°C target and 
more generally in terms of achieving “stringency.” It should be noted that, at the time the 
survey was administered, it was still unknown how many countries would pledge an INDC 
and what their content would be. The pessimism displayed by the surveyed experts has been 
confirmed by subsequent analyses of the effects of the aggregated INDCs (24, 25), which 
conclude that the Paris Agreement’s stated ambition is incompatible with what has been 
pledged so far, even assuming that all nations delivered on their promises (26). Time will tell 
if the experts’ pessimism with regards to the fulfilment of the INDCs and the ambition of 
future pledges is appropriate. 
Compared to the low confidence in stringency and the INDC approach, we find evidence of 
relatively greater optimism in the general assessments of what has been achieved, in particular 
with regards to participation of relevant actors. This finding is consistent with an increasing 
recognition of the importance of additional functions of the negotiation process apart from the 
official outcomes, as well as of the increasing role played by bottom-up solutions, polycentric 
governance, and collaborations taking place beyond traditional state actors (19-22). Within a 
fragmented climate regime, the negotiations serve as an umbrella for the numerous domestic 
and transnational climate governance initiatives, by sub- and non-state actors, which have 
been identified as a response to the gridlock in multilateral efforts (27-30). While such 
bottom-up collaborations are unlikely to suffice to compensate for the lack of ambition of the 
current governmental pledges, the hope is that these initiatives may help to strengthen future 
climate policy.  
Our second important finding is that respondents who have been highly involved in the 
negotiation process have more optimistic general views about the climate negotiations, 
compared to respondents whose involvement was limited or absent. Our data suggest that 
involvement affects the degree of optimism, and, at the same time, optimism affects the 
degree of involvement.  
One reason why involvement may alter the assessment is self-serving bias. More involved 
negotiators have greater responsibility for the outcome and may thus be more inclined to 
evaluate the negotiations more positively. It has long been known in psychology that 
perceptions of success are not only influenced by objective evidence, but also by subjective 
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impressions and needs (31-35). There are also material incentives for the negotiators to 
favorably assess the outcome of the meetings and praise their successes, such as social status 
and career prospects. An indication for the existence of self-serving bias in the outcome 
evaluation is that the positive effect of higher involvement seems to be stronger for general 
assessments than for specific assessments. Research in psychology has shown that self-
serving bias is likely to manifest itself when the assessment context is ambiguous and allows 
room for choosing the evaluation criteria (36). 
Another explanation for the positive effect of involvement on general views is information 
asymmetry between more involved and less involved negotiators. Experienced delegates have 
greater access to confidential information; they have the opportunity to interact directly with 
other negotiators and to accumulate personal knowledge which requires repeated interactions 
and established social networks. They also have a broader perspective on the achievements of 
past negotiations, historical shifts in positions and attitudes, and the difficulties that come up 
in the course of the negotiations.  
Our data also provide evidence of a self-selection effect, by showing that negotiators who 
attended the latest conferences are more optimistic than negotiators who attended earlier 
conferences and then opted out of the negotiation process. This finding applies to both general 
and specific assessments. We do not know why the negotiators left the process. National 
governments principally have control over who is part of the delegation team, but there is 
undoubtedly some discretionary scope for proposing to be included in a delegation or to drop 
out of it. Those individual decisions are likely to depend on several factors, since taking part 
in the negotiation process represents an opportunity to get access to information, contacts, and 
other benefits. However, personal perceptions of the negotiations surely play a role as well, 
with optimistic individuals being more motivated to attend the meetings than those who are 
disillusioned about the prospect of making progress. 
A direct implication of this research is that the outcomes of the negotiations can be better and 
more coherently assessed by using specific and verifiable criteria for success. Furthermore, 
since negotiators’ expectations about crucial elements of the Paris Agreement are relatively 
low, we can expect efforts to complement the agreement with additional instruments in the 
future. Scholars of climate policy have suggested a number of avenues to entice climate 
cooperation, such as trade arrangements among a coalition of leaders aimed at inducing 
compliance by laggards (37), sectoral agreements that facilitate coordination (2), improving 
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the negotiation process by streamlining its procedures and redefining the roles of key actors 
(38, 39), a shift from broad UN-style multilateralism towards minilateralism revolving around 
a smaller set of relevant actors (40), or a combination of multiple subglobal policies (27, 41). 
However, due to the increasingly fragmented governance landscape, there appears to be little 
agreement among policymakers and practitioners on how to move the negotiations forward 
(42, 43). So far negotiators have deliberately avoided linking trade agreements to climate 
policy, in order not to jeopardize successful cooperation on other issues. Whether this attitude 
will change and whether the different views will converge over time depends on many factors, 
including a shared belief that the new approach will lead to a better result overall than the 
current approach. Expectations of the involved actors are crucial (44), and since our research 
has focused on past and current climate policy, the systematic elicitation of expectations about 
not-yet-existing policy instruments appears to be a fruitful area for future research. 
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Figure Legends: 
Fig. 1. Overview of outcomes that were evaluated. The vertical axis distinguishes between 
general assessments and specific assessments. No evaluation criteria were provided in the 
general assessments, so respondents had to use their own criteria. Evaluation criteria were 
provided in the specific assessments. The horizontal axis shows the relevant time periods. For 
the evaluation of the Kyoto Protocol, we consider the attendance rate from COP 3 in 1997 in 
Kyoto to COP 7 in 2001 in Marrakesh; for all other questions we consider the attendance rate 
from COP 15 in 2009 in Copenhagen to COP 20 in 2014 in Lima. 
 
Fig. 2. The average estimated probability of being optimistic based on the number of 
conferences attended as party. Number of conferences refers to COPs 3-7 for the assessment 
of the Kyoto Protocol and to COPs 15-20 for all other questions. Solid lines apply to 
questions for which there are more than 350 observations with a strictly positive number of 
COP attendances; dashed lines apply to questions for which there are fewer than 50 
observations with a strictly positive number of COP attendances. The average estimated 
probability clearly increases with each additional conference for all but one of the general 
assessment questions (indicated by a rectangular mark). For the specific assessment questions 
(indicated by a circular mark) the probability stays constant or decreases for all but one 
question. The level of significance of the average marginal effect (*** P < 0.01, ** P < 0.05, 
* P < 0.1) is shown in the legend.     
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Fig. 3. The average estimated probability of being optimistic in a subsample who attended 
two or three COPs as party. General assessments of the Durban Platform and the usefulness of 
the climate conferences are indicated by a rectangular mark; specific assessments of the 
INDCs are indicated by a circular mark. The figure shows the difference in the assessments 
by those respondents who have attended the latest two conferences (COP 20 and COP 21, 
“Late Party”) and those who have not attended the latest conferences (“Early Party”), 
controlling for the degree of involvement. The absolute difference in percentage points (“pp”) 
is shown next to the vertical arrows. For all assessments, “early parties” are on average less 
optimistic than “late parties.”  
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Tables: 
Table 1. Regression results on general and specific assessments 
General assessments Kyoto 
Protocol 
Durban Platform Usefulness of 
COPs Participation Stringency Effectiveness 
 Optimistic Optimistic Optimistic Optimistic Optimistic 
Involvement as Party .0922*** .0450*** .0007 .0200* .0232** 
 (2.6181) (4.0997) (.0776) (1.8230) (2.0141) 
Involvement as Observer -.0136 .0384* -.0551*** -.0263 .0506** 
 (-.3274) (1.6695) (-2.7504) (-1.0660) (2.3180) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 456 550 528 551 509 
 
Specific assessments INDCs meet 2°C 
target 
Countries will 
increase INDCs 
Increased INDCs 
meet 2°C target 
Countries will 
fulfill INDCs 
 Optimistic Optimistic Optimistic Optimistic 
Involvement as Party -.0214** .0053 .0035 .0241*** 
 (-2.4472) (.5662) (.3936) (2.5956) 
Involvement as Observer -.0373* -.0020 -.0115 -.0175 
 (-1.8250) (-.0996) (-.6054) (-.8471) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 580 568 572 584 
The numbers show binary probit estimations of average marginal effects and z-values in parentheses. The 
models are estimated with maximum likelihood, using heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. The stochastic 
component in the models is assumed to be normally distributed. The dependent variable is a dummy, taking the 
value 1 if an individual response is categorized as optimistic and 0 otherwise. Level of significance: 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. “Involvement as Party” is the number of COPs attended as party, 
“Involvement as Observer” is the number of COPs attended as observer (COPs 3-7 for the Kyoto Protocol and 
COPs 15-20 for all others). In addition to the shown explanatory variables, the estimations control for gender, 
age, trust in own intuitions, perceived importance of climate change, expected consequences of climate change, 
expectations about emissions reductions in the absence of an international climate agreement, field of the highest 
degree or training, type of current employer organization, nationality at the continent level, and level of CO2 
emissions per capita in 2013 in respondents’ country of citizenship/delegation. 
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Table 2. Regression results on the assessment of recent outcomes holding the degree of 
involvement constant 
General assessments Durban Platform Usefulness of 
COPs  Participation Stringency Effectiveness 
 Optimistic Optimistic Optimistic Optimistic 
Party at latest COPs .0914 .1536* .2056** .0705 
 (.9877) (1.9487) (2.4843) (2.8077) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 115 102 117 99 
 
Specific assessments INDCs meet 2°C 
target 
Countries will 
increase INDCs 
Increased INDCs 
meet 2°C target 
Countries will 
fulfill INDCs 
 Optimistic Optimistic Optimistic Optimistic 
Party at latest COPs .1727*** .0294 .1344* .2063*** 
 (2.9509) (.4086) (1.8147) (2.5946) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 122 121 119 111 
Regressions based on a subsample using only individuals with two or three COP attendances as party. The 
numbers show binary probit estimations of average marginal effects and z-values in parentheses. The models are 
estimated with maximum likelihood, using heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. The stochastic component 
in the models is assumed to be normally distributed. The dependent variable is a dummy, taking the value 1 if an 
individual response is categorized as optimistic and 0 otherwise. Level of significance: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, 
* p < 0.1. “Party at latest COPs” is a dummy, taking the value 1 if an individual attended COPs 20 and 21 as 
party and 0 otherwise. In addition to the shown explanatory variables the estimations control for gender, age, 
trust in own intuitions, expectations about emissions reductions in the absence of an international climate 
agreement, field of the highest degree of training, and nationality at the continent level. 
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Methods 
Our data stem from a worldwide survey carried out in the months preceding COP 21 in Paris 
by means of a standardized online questionnaire that consisted of three parts. In the first part, 
participants were asked to assess (i) the consequences of climate change for the future living 
conditions up to 2100; (ii) the importance of climate change policy; and (iii) the chances that 
countries would reduce their emissions relative to business-as-usual in the absence of a new 
international climate agreement. The second part was about the perceived success of the 
climate negotiations. Participants were asked to assess (i) the Kyoto Protocol; (ii) the future 
success of the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action with respect to participation, stringency, 
and overall effectiveness; (iii)  the INDCs; and (iv) the usefulness of the climate conferences 
apart from the official outcome. All assessments in the first and second part were elicited by 
means of a Likert-type scale with either four or five possible answer categories. The third part 
of the questionnaire contained questions about the participants’ personal background, such as 
gender, age, nationality, the field in which they have obtained their highest degree or training, 
and the type of organization in which they work. This part also included a question on how 
much respondents trust their intuitions when they make decisions. Psychological studies have 
shown that judgements often depend on whether a person relies on his or her intuition, as 
opposed to careful reasoning (45). In the empirical analysis, we used the responses from the 
second part as dependent variables and the responses from the first part and the third part as 
explanatory variables. The definitions and summary statistics of the explanatory variables can 
be found in the Supplementary Tables S2 and S3. 
The invitation to take part in the online questionnaire was sent out via email. The contacts 
came from two sources. First, we used four participation lists for the Conferences of Parties 
between 2010 and 2014 provided by the UNFCCC (COPs 16-18, COP 20). The email 
addresses came from previous studies or were searched in the Internet. The COP participation 
lists provided by the UNFCCC distinguish between “parties” and “observer organizations.” 
To have a clear and transparent selection criterion, we only invited people who were listed on 
the UNFCCC participation lists at least once as party. This means that, apart from scientists, 
non-state actors are only included in the sample if they have been part of national delegations. 
Individuals who attended the COPs only as observer (and never as party) are not included. 
This group of participants has clearly become much larger and more diverse over the years 
(17, 20), which is why we believe that their perceptions deserve a study of its own. 
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The second source was the list of authors and reviewers for the fifth IPCC Assessment Report 
which is available on the IPCC website. The email addresses were obtained through Internet 
searches. Including the IPCC sample increased the variation in the COP attendance rates as, 
by definition, delegates are more likely to attend multiple COPs as party. Importantly, when 
we pool the UNFCCC sample and the IPCC sample in a regression, we always control for 
region, field of highest training, employer organization, and other socio-demographic and 
attitudinal characteristics.  
Out of a total of about 10,000 contacted persons whose contact details were available, 656 
completed the survey and could be used for the empirical analyses. The response rate of 6.6% 
is not high but fairly typical for this kind of survey (5-8, 12). Separated by source, we 
approached 9,120 people listed on the UNFCCC lists and 900 people on the IPCC list. The 
response rates for these two groups were 5% and 22%, respectively. Since the response rate 
for the UNFCCC sample is relatively low, we conducted two different non-response analyses 
for this group. First, we compared the regional distribution between respondents who 
completed the survey and non-respondents who were contacted but did not complete the 
survey. Of the UNFCCC participants who completed our survey, 27% are from Europe, 23% 
from Africa, 20% from Asia, 13% from North America, another 13% from South America, 
and 4% from Australia/Oceania. The respective frequencies for the contacted persons who did 
not complete the survey are 22%, 27%, 24%, 10%, 13%, and 4%. Note that the proportions 
are based on delegation country and not nationalities as delegation country is the only 
available information for non-respondents. The regional distribution of respondents and non-
respondents are not significantly different from each other (Pearson Chi squared test, P > 
0.10). They are also very similar to the regional distribution of the recent COPs. Of the parties 
to COPs 16-20, on average, 21% were from Europe, 27% from Africa, 25% from Africa, 9% 
from North America, 13% from South America, and 4% from Australia/Oceania. Second, we 
compared the answers between respondents and dropouts (people who started but did not 
complete the survey). Of course, we could only compare the answers to the questions that 
enough of the dropouts answered which mainly were the questions in the first part of the 
survey (on the impacts of climate change and the importance of climate change policy). The 
number of dropouts that could be used for the comparisons ranges between 67 and 120. 
Depending on the type of question, we used Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon tests, Fisher’s Exact 
tests, or T-tests. For 20 out of 21 questions the answers were not significantly different 
between the two groups (P > 0.10). Based on these comparisons, we do not expect a selection 
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bias in the data. Further details on the participants can be found in the Supplementary Table 
S1 and separate analyses for the UNFCCC sample and the IPCC sample can be found in 
Tables S7-S10. They show that our main results can be found in both samples. 
In the main paper, we present results from binary probit models for which the dependent 
variable “optimistic” was built by merging multiple answer categories of the Likert scale into 
one. When there were four answer categories, the optimistic variable takes the value one 
when the respondent chose one of the two more optimistic answer categories and it equals 
zero when one of the two more pessimistic answer categories was chosen. When there were 
five answer categories, we combine the first two, more optimistic, categories to set the 
optimistic variable to one, and combine the last three, more pessimistic, categories to set the 
variable to zero. In the Supplementary Tables 14 and 15, we provide regression results from 
ordered probit models which are generally very close to the results from the binary probit 
models presented in the main paper. 
We also provide an overview of the effects of the control variables on the dependent variable 
(Supplementary Tables 4 and 5). The results show that the individuals who are optimistic 
about countries’ willingness to reduce emissions in the absence of a new international 
agreement up to 2050 (besides the existing UNFCCC) are also more inclined to provide more 
optimistic evaluations of the climate conferences. A plausible explanation for this is that these 
individuals are generally more optimistic about the feasibility of climate policy, for example 
in terms of emission abatement costs or future technological progress. Another finding that 
consistently comes up is that individuals who rely on their intuitions often provide a more 
optimistic assessment. Although we cannot say much about the cognitive and psychological 
processes behind this relationship, it is interesting to know that confidence in intuitive 
thinking is associated with an optimistic view while low confidence in intuitive thinking 
appears to be associated with a more pessimistic view. Researchers working for a university 
or research institute as well as individuals working for an environmental NGO or a private 
company tend to be more pessimistic about the INDC approach than government officials. 
The effects of region are not clear-cut, with one plain exception: Europeans are more likely to 
see the Kyoto Protocol as success compared to almost every other region (or negotiation 
block). This is not surprising since the Europeans were the driving force behind the Kyoto 
Protocol, especially when the US gave way for new leadership by choosing not to ratify the 
agreement. 
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Finally, we provide additional regression analyses in the Supplementary Tables 11-13 to 
account for the diversity within the national delegations (22). To this end, we use the 
information about individual affiliations provided in the COP participation lists (instead or in 
addition to the employer organization). With a few exceptions (less than 1%), party members 
in the sample rarely changed the affiliation category from one COP to another; that is, 
individuals might have switched between different government institutions but they rarely 
switched between government and non-government institutions. Most of the respondents who 
attended the COPs as party represented a government institution (67%) but a significant share 
of respondents assumed a dual role by being part of a delegation but not affiliated with a 
government institution (33%). These individuals had affiliations with a university or research 
institution, business or state company, NGO, or other organizations. The results show that 
only seldom does having a dual role have a significant effect on perceptions. Only with 
regards to future pledges meeting the 2°C target, respondents with dual roles are significantly 
more optimistic than the government actors. The regressions also include an interaction term 
of dual role and involvement in order to test if the effect of involvement differs between 
government and non-government party members. The interaction term is statistically 
significant only once: with regards to the fulfillment of the pledges the positive effect of 
involvement appears to be stronger for respondents with dual roles. 
The authors declare that the data supporting the findings of this study are available within the 
article and its supplementary information files. Informed consent was obtained from all 
subjects who participated in the study. The research is in accordance with national and EU 
legislation and with the ethical standards and guidelines of the EU Horizon2020 concerning 
data collection, storage, protection, retention, and destruction. 
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